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NORMATIVE MODELING FOR GLOBAL 
ECONOMIC GOVERNANCE: THE CASE OF 
THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) 
Edward S. Cohen* 
INTRODUCTION 
he United Nations Commission on International Trade Law 
(“UNCITRAL”) was created by the General Assembly in 1966 
and given a mandate to “to further the progressive harmonization and 
unification of the law of international trade.”1 In contrast to the emphasis 
placed on public law in the works of institutions such as the World Trade 
Organization (“WTO”), UNCITRAL’s focus is on private international 
law, defined as “the laws applicable to private parties in international 
transactions.”2 After approximately two decades of small accomplish-
ments and little recognition, however, UNCITRAL has emerged as an 
increasingly significant player in shaping the law and politics of interna-
tional trade.3 Its work product—model laws, legislative guides, contrac-
tual and arbitration rules, and conventions—is increasingly influential in 
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 1. FAQ—Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L 
TRADE LAW (UNCITRAL) (Jan. 1, 2011), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin_faq.html [hereinafter UNCITRAL 
FAQ]. 
 2. Id. 
 3. See, e.g., Claire R. Kelly, The Politics of International Economic Law: Legitima-
cy and the UNCITRAL Working Methods 1 (2009) (unpublished manuscript), available 
at http://works.bepress.com/claire_kelly/15 (citing U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
THE UNCITRAL GUIDE: BASIC FACTS ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON 
INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, at 1, U.N. Sales No. E.07.V.12 (2007) (“UNCITRAL de-
velops international norms that affect a variety of trade issues. It has had considerable 
success.”)). 
T 
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shaping the law of global commerce.4 Moreover, UNCITRAL engages in 
sustained cooperation with other public and private international organi-
zations involved in shaping the legal frameworks of national and global 
commerce and investment.5 
The aims of this Article are threefold: to present an overview of 
UNCITRAL and its role, explain how and why it has increased its pres-
ence in shaping international economic law, and explore how 
UNCITRAL’s work and structure can help advance an understanding of 
the legal construction of the global political economy. The Article argues 
that UNCITRAL, as an institution, is best understood as a “site” for nor-
mative modeling6 through which legal norms, principles, and standards 
for the global political economy are articulated. At stake in 
UNCITRAL’s work is influence over the definition of normative stan-
dards that shape legal rules throughout the global economy, definitions 
over which actors with political, economic, and professional stakes com-
pete intensely to control. These actors include states, corporate and in-
dustry representatives, legal experts and professionals, and other public 
and private international organizations. Without significant institutional 
resources of its own, UNCITRAL acts only when it is mobilized or 
“enrolled” by these actors.7 
Two features of UNCITRAL’s practice—the variety of forms through 
which it articulates legal norms and the unique political structures 
through which it works—make it increasingly attractive to resource-rich 
actors attempting to mold the law that governs contemporary internation-
al commerce. These features also enable UNCITRAL to draw simulta-
neously on political and technical standards of legitimacy for its work, 
further increasing its value for these actors. Increasingly, however, 
claims about the legitimacy of UNCITRAL’s work as global standards of 
law have come under internal and external critiques.8 The dynamics of 
                                                                                                             
 4. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, THE UNCITRAL GUIDE: BASIC FACTS 
ABOUT THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE LAW, at 1, U.N. 
Sales No. E.07.V.12 (2007) [hereinafter UNCITRAL GUIDE]. 
 5. See id. 
 6. A normative model may be defined as “a prescriptive model which evaluates 
alternative solutions to answer the question, ‘what is going on?’ and suggests what ought 
to be done or how things should work according to an assumption or standard.” 
BUSINESSDICTIONARY.COM, http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/normative-
model.html (last visited Oct. 15, 2010). 
 7. Steve Charnovitz, The Relevance of Non-State Actors to International Law, in 
DEVELOPMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW IN TREATY MAKING 543, 544–48 (Rüdiger Wol-
frum & Volker Röben eds., 2005) (advancing the notion that many international organi-
zations function as arenas for action rather than actors themselves). 
 8. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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these claims and criticisms provide insight into larger questions regard-
ing the substance and control over the legal rules governing global com-
merce. 
I. NORMATIVE MODELING IN GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 
In their magisterial work on the regulation of the global economy, 
Braithwaite and Drahos note that the constitution of business regulation 
on the global level is a complex process involving various agents, me-
chanisms, and locations.9 The key agents in this process are major states, 
large corporate organizations, certain international institutions, key busi-
ness organizations, and legal and business professionals acting in organi-
zations or as individual “policy entrepreneurs.”10 With rare exceptions, 
these actors share the ability to mobilize significant resources to engage 
mechanisms to advance their priorities and to catalyze projects for struc-
turing the global political economy.11 The most important of these me-
chanisms include military and economic coercion, reciprocal adjustment, 
systems of reward, and modeling.12 The central pattern is one in which 
various agents employ a number of mechanisms that interact with one 
another to shape the “contest of principles” governing the scope and di-
rection of specific areas of regulation.13 These contests play out in a va-
riety of locations, or “sites,” where regulations are defined and en-
forced.14 These locations span the transnational, international, state, re-
gional, and local level and can be of a public, private, or hybrid charac-
ter. Given the variety and shifting nature of sites of regulatory practice, 
the most effective actors are ones that are able to “forum shift” among 
these sites, galvanizing support and advancing a common regulatory 
project.15 
                                                                                                             
 9. See generally JOHN BRAITHWAITE & PETER DRAHOS, GLOBAL BUSINESS 
REGULATION  (2000). 
 10. JOHN KINGDON, AGENDAS, ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES 188–93 (2d ed., 
1997). 
 11. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 27–28, 475–06. 
 12. See id. at 532–49. 
 13. See id. at 507–31. 
 14. SASKIA SASSEN, TERRITORY, AUTHORITY, RIGHTS 69–70 (2006) (referring to 
“global cities” as key sites for innovation in the global economy. More generally, a “site” 
can refer to any institutional context for rule or law-making, interpretation, and enforce-
ment.). 
 15. See Edward S. Cohen, Constructing Power Through Law: Private Law Pluralism 
and Harmonization in the Global Political Economy, 15 REV. INT’L POL. ECON. 770 
(2008) [hereinafter Cohen, Constructing Power Through Law]. See BRAITHWAITE & 
DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 564–78, for a more detailed exploration of forum-shifting. See 
Peter Drahos, Securing the Future of Intellectual Property: Intellectual Property Owners 
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Normative modeling, in which actors attempt to define principles, 
standards, and rules that guide regulatory practices, plays a particularly 
important role in shaping global business law and regulation, one that is 
often unrecognized.16 Such modeling is identified as an “important” me-
chanism of globalization in every field of business regulation as analyzed 
by Braithwaite and Drahos—a status few other mechanisms can claim.17 
But special care is needed in discussing normative modeling, as discus-
sions of this process often begin with flawed assumptions.18 Here, it is 
necessary to clarify three important starting points for this discussion. 
First, the process or mechanism of normative modeling should be un-
derstood as one that takes place simultaneously with, and often as part of, 
an attempt to use other mechanisms of regulatory globalization.19 Thus, 
coercive power and/or strategies of economic reward are often embodied 
in attempts at normative modeling, and advocates of particular normative 
models often try to engage actors with coercive or reward-based re-
sources to help advance their agendas for shaping dominant models in a 
given area of regulation. As Braithwaite and Drahos put it, “modeling is 
patterned according to configurations of power.”20 In order to capture 
this interaction, they draw on the concept of “enrollment,” which refers 
to the ways actors using different mechanisms are continually looking to 
mobilize each other to pursue projects of mutual interest.21 In the specific 
context of international economic law, one can follow Susan Sell by un-
derstanding this process as one in which power can be mobilized through 
law and vice-versa.22 
The second point is that normative modeling is usually driven by 
transnational coalitions, linking state power, private interests, and specif-
                                                                                                             
and their Nodally Coordinated Enforcement Pyramid, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 53 
(2004), for an illustration of the application of forum-shifting to intellectual property law. 
 16. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 539–43. 
 17. Id. at 539. 
 18. Id. at 19–20. The term “norms” is used here as the most general category for de-
scribing the structure of a model for laws and regulations, within which principles, stan-
dards, and guidelines are sub-categories. Id. 
 19. See, e.g., David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism, in 598 
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (2005) (exploring the concept and the dynamics 
of “regulatory globalization”). 
 20. BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 583. 
 21. Id. at 32. 
 22. See generally SUSAN K. SELL, POWER & IDEAS vii (1998) (analyzing “North-South 
politics and diplomacy of technology transfer, antitrust, and intellectual property in two 
eras—from the early 1970s  to 1985[,] and from 1985 to the present”); see also SUSAN K. 
SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW (2003). 
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ic (in this case legal) expertise.23 Scholars often emphasize, with good 
reason, the role of formal public institutions and organizations as the 
main vehicles through which norms are articulated, enforced, and legiti-
mized.24 But norms develop and consolidate in a variety of sites, as nor-
mative entrepreneurs25 continually search for vehicles onto which they 
can attach their preferred models, principles, and rules. Thus, in the area 
of international economic law, norms can be modeled and diffused 
through standard contracts,26 common practices in markets and indus-
tries,27 the work of law firms and bar associations,28 court decisions,29 
and legal scholarship,30 as well as through the activities of public institu-
tions at the national and international levels.31 Normative entrepreneurs, 
who may be located in public, private, or expert positions, work conti-
nually to engage various mechanisms to enroll a variety of actors and 
sites into specific modeling projects.32 
                                                                                                             
 23. See Susan K. Sell & Aseem Prakash, Using Ideas Strategically: The Contest Be-
tween Business and NGO Networks in Intellectual Property Rights, 48 INT’L STUD. Q. 143 
(2004) (analyzing the roles of coalitions of private business interests and legal expertise 
in shaping international legal norms). 
 24. See, e.g., IAN HURD, AFTER ANARCHY: LEGITIMACY AND POWER IN THE UNITED 
NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL (2007); Thomas M. Franck, Legitimacy in the International 
System, 82 AM. J. INT’L L. 705, 725–35 (1988). 
 25. See KINGDON, supra note 10. The role of normative (and/or policy) entrepreneurs 
is discussed in detail in BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 18–26. 
 26. See, e.g., John Flood & Eleni Skordaki, Structuring Transactions: The Case of 
Real Estate Finance, in CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE 157, 157 
(Volkmar Gessner ed., 2009). 
 27. See, e.g., Debora L. Spar, Lost in (Cyber)space: The Private Rules of Online 
Commerce, in PRIVATE AUTHORITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 31, 32 (A. Claire Cutler, 
Virginia Haufler & Tony Porter eds., 1999). 
 28. See, e.g., John Flood & Fabian P. Sosa, Lawyers, Law Firms, and the Stabiliza-
tion of International Business, 28 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 489, 490 (2008) (explaining that, 
although states’ legal systems are “a basic necessary condition,” law firms and law asso-
ciations play a large role in shaping transnational business and enterprise). 
 29. See, e.g., ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 1, 65–100, 131–54 
(2004). 
 30. See Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in Internation-
al Context, 34 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 603 (2009). 
 31. See id.; see also JARROD WIENER, GLOBALIZATION AND THE HARMONIZATION OF 
LAW (1999). 
 32. Although the focus of this Article is on the work of one public institution, 
UNCITRAL’s role in normative modeling cannot be fully understood unless it is placed 
in the context of these and other settings in which norms are developed and diffused. 
Indeed, it is the manner in which UNCITRAL’s products and processes fit in with these 
dynamics of normative modeling in private international law that made it an increasingly 
influential site in the development of commercial law. 
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The final starting point is the recognition of the role of legitimacy in 
the fate of normative modeling projects for the global economy. In his 
classic and still widely influential essay, Mark Suchman defines legiti-
macy as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an 
entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially con-
structed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions.”33 While actors 
and coalitions invest in legal norms to advance their power and interests, 
the success of specific legal rules, standards, codes, and principles de-
pends on their ability to claim some kind of legitimacy independent of 
these actors’ motivations.34 
In the context of global economic governance, legal rules and regimes 
are usually justified in two ways.35 One approach is political, emphasiz-
ing the scope of affected interests incorporated into the processes by 
which models are developed and adopted.36 In this approach, legal re-
gimes are considered legitimate to the extent that they are acceptable to 
the agents most impacted by their operation and the extent to which they 
conform to widely accepted principles of regulation.37 The other ap-
proach is a technical one, in which regimes are judged by the sophistica-
tion of their drafting, their likelihood of attaining the regulatory ends de-
sired, and the involvement of leading experts in their development.38 In 
the context of private international law, for example, legal regimes are 
often justified by their proven ability to facilitate the mobility of capital 
and encourage investment that produces increases in wealth.39 This Ar-
                                                                                                             
 33. Mark C. Suchman, Managing Legitimacy: Strategic and Institutional Approach-
es, 20 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 571, 574 (1995). 
 34. For a systematic analysis of this relationship, and of the role of international legal 
discourse in constituting and shaping legitimacy claims, see FRIEDRICH V. KRATOCHWIL, 
RULES, NORMS, AND DECISIONS: ON THE CONDITIONS OF PRACTICAL AND LEGAL 
REASONING IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND DOMESTIC AFFAIRS (1989). 
 35. This Article employs the distinction between “political” and “technical” legitima-
cy claims because it conforms to the language used by the participants in UNCITRAL’s 
work, and serves best to illuminate the forms in which emerging challenges to the legiti-
macy of this work have been articulated and advanced. But see Suchman, supra note 33, 
at 577–84 (distinguishing between “pragmatic,” “moral,” and “cognitive” forms of legi-
timacy claims). 
 36. This notion is equivalent to Majone’s classic definition and discussion of “proce-
dural legitimacy.” See Giandomenico Majone, Regulatory Legitimacy, in REGULATING 
EUROPE 291–94 (Jeremy Richardson ed., 1996). 
 37. See id. 
 38. Id. at 294 (although Majone categorizes this dimension as “substantive legitima-
cy”). 
 39. See, e.g., Harold S. Burman, The Commercial Challenge in Modernizing Secured 
Transactions Law, 8 UNIF. L. REV.347 (2003) (Burman is Assistant Legal Advisor for 
Private International Law in the U.S. Department of State, and has been the U.S. repre-
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ticle postulates that UNCITRAL’s work has proven itself amenable to 
both kinds of legitimacy claims, and this has been a key factor in its 
growing influence and the willingness of resource-rich actors to invest in 
its work. 
Legitimacy claims, however, are fluid and always subject to contesta-
tion and change.40 As understandings of legitimacy evolve, claims that 
were once unchallenged come under pressure from old and new actors as 
well as the institutions that utilize them.41 Two kinds of processes that 
generate these challenges are especially relevant to the case of 
UNCITRAL. First, initially shared understandings of the way an institu-
tion works can be shattered as the evolution of the institution gradually 
transforms its patterns of operation and/or its work product begins to 
move in directions unanticipated by and unacceptable to key actors. 
Second, the growing interactions between different sites in the field of 
global business regulation and the degree to which any particular site 
conforms to a given understanding of what makes the rule-making legi-
timate can generate challenges to these accepted understandings.42 Both 
kinds of processes are currently at work in the context of UNCITRAL, 
raising key questions regarding the larger process of the constitution of 
legal regimes for global commerce. 
                                                                                                             
sentative in a number of UNCITRAL Working Groups. See HAROLD S. BURMAN, 
http://pages.cthome.net/hplowry/Burman/ (last visited Jan. 13, 2011)); Hannah L. Bux-
baum, Unification of the Law Governing Secured Transactions: Progress and Prospects 
for Reform, 8 UNIF. L. REV. 321 (2003); see also Robert Wai, Transnational Private Law 
and Private Ordering in a Contested Global Society, 46 HARV. INT’L L.J. 471(2005) [he-
reinafter Wai, Transnational Private Law]; Robert Wai, Transnational Liftoff and Juridi-
cal Touchdown: The Regulatory Function of Private International Law in an Era of Glo-
balization, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 209 (2002) [hereinafter Wai, Transnational Lif-
toff]. 
 40. See Suchman, supra note 33. 
 41. Id. at 585–99 (recognizing these dynamics and identifying the challenge of “legi-
timacy management” as central to the success of any organization). In effect, this Article 
suggests that UNCITRAL is now engaged in just such management. 
 42. See DAVID SZABLOWSKI, TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND LOCAL STRUGGLES, MINING, 
COMMUNITIES AND THE WORLD BANK 292–93 (2007). This is often referred to as a situa-
tion of “interlegality,” which Szablowski defines as “the overlapping or ‘intertwined’ 
action of different legal orders upon a single social situation.” Id. For the centrality of this 
phenomenon in the literature on transnational legal pluralism, see GRALF-PETER CALLIESS 
& PEER ZUMBANSEN, ROUGH CONSENSUS AND RUNNING CODE: A THEORY OF 
TRANSNATIONAL PRIVATE LAW (2010) (describing and analyzing various law-making 
regimes in the transnational arena). 
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II. UNCITRAL: HISTORY AND WORK 
A. The Origins of UNCITRAL 
The impetus behind the creation of UNCITRAL, in 1966, must be put 
into two different contexts: the history of private law harmonization 
since the 1890s, and the changing political economy of international 
trade in the mid-1960s.43 The project to “harmonize” or “unify” private 
international commercial law emerged in the 1890s, as a by-product of 
the intensifying economic interchanges of that period, sometimes called 
the “first wave” of globalization.44 It was a project driven by legal aca-
demics, jurists, and politicians almost exclusively from the world of Con-
tinental European “civil law” states.45 The idea behind this project was 
the contention that diversity of legal rules and procedures in such funda-
mental areas as contracts, property, and jurisdiction acts as a hindrance to 
deeper economic interaction across the states.46 It was argued that by 
“harmonizing” or “unifying” law in these key areas, economic integra-
tion would be facilitated, which in turn would lead to more peaceful rela-
tionships between states.47 
The immediate impact of this project was limited, but it did leave both 
an institutional and programmatic legacy. The institutional legacy was 
the formation of the Hague Conference on Private International Law in 
189348 and of the International Institute for the Unification of Private 
                                                                                                             
 43. The following discussion, which is part of a larger research project by the Author 
on the politics of private international law, draws on the study of UNCITRAL docu-
ments, interviews with participants, observation of UNCITRAL Working Groups, and on 
a small but growing body of scholarly work which is presented in subsequent notes. In-
terviews with UNCITRAL Officials and participants were, in most cases, conducted on 
the agreement that the individuals would not be named, but that their position could be 
indicated in ways that did not compromise the confidentiality of the views expressed. 
This Article follows that practice. 
 44. A. CLAIRE CUTLER, PRIVATE POWER AND GLOBAL AUTHORITY 180–240 (2003). On 
the history of globalization, see JEFFREY A. FRIEDEN, GLOBAL CAPITALISM: ITS FALL AND 
RISE IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (2006). 
 45. CUTLER, supra note 44, at 207–11. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Note that “harmonization” of law means adjusting the rules of different legal 
systems so that they follow the same substantive principles in specific areas, even if they 
remain distinctive in some features; “unification” means that different states agree to 
adopt exactly similar rules in specific areas of law, usually through international conven-
tions. See David. W. Leebron, Lying Down With Procrustes: An Analysis of Harmoniza-
tion Claims, in 1 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FAIR TRADE? 41 
(Jagdish Baghwati & Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). 
 48. See Statute of the Hague Conference on Private International Law art.1, Oct. 31, 
1951, 220 U.N.T.S. 121 (entered into force on July 15, 1955 and amended on Jan. 1, 
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Law (“UNIDROIT”) in 1926,49 which created stable fora through which 
experts and government officials could sustain the project over time and 
extend the scope and depth of their own networks of interested parties. 
Both institutions remain active today and indeed are involved in increa-
singly substantial cooperation with each other and with UNCITRAL.50 
Perhaps more importantly, the discourse and institutions created in this 
period generated a stable core of personnel and ideas that sustained the 
project of harmonization/unification, and established the basic frame-
work for thinking about the value, purposes, and strategies for such 
projects.51 
The second part of the context of UNCITRAL’s formation was the 
changing politics and economics of the post-World War II global sys-
tem.52 On the one hand, by the mid-1960s, the quickly increasing number 
of newly independent “developing” states began to take an active pres-
ence in multilateral discussions of issues surrounding the structure of the 
international economy.53 Much of this activity focused on the United Na-
tions (“UN”) system, which offered access and voice unavailable to these 
states in other contexts. In the General Assembly, Economic and Social 
Council (“ECOSOC”), and especially the UN Commission on Trade and 
Development (“UNCTAD”), developing states began pushing an aggres-
sive program demanding aid and investment from developed states and 
criticizing key structural elements of the international economic order.54 
At the same time, the United States began to engage deeply in these de-
bates at the multilateral level, perceiving this as a necessary aspect of the 
Cold War era competition for influence among the newly independent 
states. The US and its allies, however, faced structural impediments with 
                                                                                                             
2007) [hereinafter Hague Conference] (“The purpose of the Hague Conference is to work 
for the progressive unification of the rules of private international law.”). 
 49. See UNIDROIT: An Overview, INT’L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
(UNIDROIT), http://www.unidroit.org/dynasite.cfm?dsmid=103284 (last visited Feb. 18, 
2011). UNIDROIT was initially established as part of the League of Nations system, and 
was re-established in 1940 by participating states. Id. 
 50. For a review of UNCITRAL’s work with UNIDROIT and The Hague Confe-
rence, see UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 10–12. 
 51. See CUTLER, supra note 44, at 211–25. 
 52. In addition to personal interviews with UNCITRAL Officials, the following dis-
cussion is based generally on the accounts referenced in Susan Block-Lieb & Terence 
Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization in UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Insol-
vency Law, 42 TEX. INT’L L.J. 475, 479 (2007) [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Har-
monization and Modernization]. See also CUTLER, supra note 44. 
 53. For an overview of the role of developing states in the United Nations system 
during this era, see JOAN E. SPERO & JEFFREY A. HART, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS, 221–25 (5th ed., 1997). 
 54. Id. 
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the existing UN agencies. The one state/one vote rule, the dominance of 
critical perspectives in UNCTAD, and the general politicization of the 
debates in most UN fora limited US influence and led to a search for al-
ternative institutional arenas in which to advance its interests in promot-
ing a generally capitalist, market-oriented development agenda.55 
UNCITRAL was created in response to this dilemma, though its emer-
gence was rather circuitous.56 The starting point was the adoption, in 
1958 by a United Nations diplomatic conference, of the New York Con-
vention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards 
(“New York Convention”).57 The New York Convention marked the first 
time that the US government, and key elements of the US legal commu-
nity, played an active role in advancing the reformation and harmoniza-
tion of elements of private commercial law as a tool for furthering global 
economic integration.58 The quick adoption and initial success of the 
New York Treaty led the US and key European and Latin American 
states to explore the notion of creating a formal institution to incorporate 
the harmonization/unification project within the UN system.59 
In 1965, the Secretary General commissioned a study of the need for 
and potential of a UN Commission to advance this project,60 led by Clive 
Schmitthoff—the leading British authority on the law of international 
trade—and including legal experts from developed and developing 
states.61 The resulting “Schmitthoff Report”62 formed the basis for a con-
                                                                                                             
 55. See CUTLER, supra note 44; see also Interview with U.S. Officials active in 
UNCITRAL’s work, in Washington, D.C. (Sept. 21, 2004) [hereinafter Sept. 21 Inter-
view]. 
 56. See generally CUTLER, supra note 44 (providing an overview of this process). 
 57. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 
June 10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S. 38 (entered into force June 7, 1959). 
 58. See generally Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitra-
tion, 56 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 233 (2008) (exploring the re-emergence of arbitration and its 
impact on the study and practice of law). 
 59. See CUTLER, supra note 44. 
 60. For example, the harmonization and unification of the law of international trade. 
 61. See Nikitas E. Hatzimihail, The Many Lives—and Faces—of Lex Mercatoria: 
History as Genealogy in International Business Law, 71 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 169, 
175–90 (2008) (providing insight into Schmitthoff’s background on and his role in the 
creation of UNCITRAL). 
 62. U.N Secretary-General, Progressive Development of the Law of International 
Trade: Report of the Secretary-General, ¶¶ 49–51, U.N. Doc. A/6396 (Sept. 23, 1966) 
[hereinafter Progressive Development Report]. The Secretary-General prepared this re-
port on the basis of Dr. Clive M. Schmitthoff’s study on the subject. Id. ¶¶ 1–3. The re-
port became widely referred to as the “Schmitthoff’s Report” or the “Schmitthoff Study” 
for this reason. See Progressive Development of the Law of International Trade Official 
Records of the General Assembly—Meetings of the Sixth Committee, U.N. COMM’N ON 
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sensus that led to the creation of UNCITRAL by the General Assembly 
in December, 1966.63 At its foundation, UNCITRAL was given the re-
sponsibility to oversee the further development of the New York Con-
vention and to explore other areas where legal harmonization seemed 
possible.64 The first Chair of the Commission was John Honnold, an 
American legal expert with significant connections to the harmoniza-
tion/unification expert community.65 
The consensus leading to UNCITRAL was the product of a unique 
confluence of interests that led a number of actors to invest resources in 
the creation of a new organization. For key non-European states—the 
US, some developing states, and even the Soviet bloc—UNCITRAL 
provided a forum for advance commercial law reform projects outside of 
the West European-dominated fora of the Hague and UNIDROIT.66 For 
the US and its allies in some key developing states in particular, 
UNCITRAL offered a forum in which they could pursue market-oriented 
legal change outside of the heavily “politicized” and confrontational 
UNCTAD environment.67 For the legal experts committed to the harmo-
nization project, UNCITRAL most likely presented an opportunity to 
revive their fortunes by attaching their work to the wider legitimacy of 
the UN system. In effect, UNCITRAL was the result of a decision by the 
US and key developed and developing states that the project of private 
law harmonization/unification could be used to advance their develop-
ment projects, but only if pursued in a new, more inclusive, and diffe-
rently structured organizational context.68 UNCITRAL’s creation, then, 
amounted to the creation of a new forum to allow the pursuit of a forum-
shifting strategy.69 
                                                                                                             
INT’L TRADE LAW (Feb. 1, 2010), 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/sessions/pre.html (referring to the report 
to the Secretary General as “The Schmitthoff Study”). 
 63. Progressive Development Report, supra note 62. 
 64. Id. 
 65. This alliance between key states and a cohesive international network of legal 
experts has been central to all of UNCITRAL’s subsequent work. More generally, the 
harmonization project can be seen (in Sassen’s terms) as a residual “capability” created 
for one set of purposes but then mobilized for the creation of a different type of regime. 
See SASSEN, supra note 14, at 37–38. 
 66. See CUTLER, supra note 44, at 211–25. 
 67. See id.; see also SPERO & HART, supra note 53. 
 68. See CUTLER, supra note 44; see also SPERO & HART, supra note 53. 
 69. See sources cited supra notes 66–67. 
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B. Forms of Work 
How does UNCITRAL “do” normative modeling? UNCITRAL’s cur-
rent understanding of its mission mixes the mandate to “harmonize” and 
“unify” law with an emphasis on the development and understanding of 
commercial law that embodies “best practice” standards for the promo-
tion of trade and investment across national borders in the context of di-
vergent legal traditions.70 As the organization’s “Frequently Asked Ques-
tions” (“FAQ”) page asserts: 
“Harmonization” and “unification” of the law of international trade re-
fers to the process through which the law facilitating international 
commerce is created and adopted. International commerce may be hin-
dered by factors such as the lack of a predictable governing law or out-
of-date laws unsuited to commercial practice. The United Nations 
Commission on International Trade Law identifies such problems and 
then carefully crafts solutions which are acceptable to States having 
different legal systems and levels of economic and social develop-
ment.71 
UNCITRAL’s goal is to become one of the leading, authoritative in-
ternational bodies in this area and to advance standards that are widely 
accepted by states and private agents in the global economy.72 In order to 
accomplish these goals, UNCITRAL generates four different types of 
work products:73 
1. The generation of a multilateral treaty (known as a “Convention”), 
which is adopted by the Commission and then put out for ratification 
by states. By signing and then approving such a Convention, a state 
commits to changing aspects of domestic law to conform to a common 
international approach; it can do this by applying the exact same provi-
sions (unification) or by adopting rules that embody a general set of 
principles (harmonization). 
                                                                                                             
 70. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. But cf. Terence C. Halliday, Legitimacy, Tech-
nology, and Leverage: The Building Blocks of Insolvency Architecture in the Decade 
Past and the Decade Ahead, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L. L. 1081, 1097–98 (2007) (discussing the 
concept of “best practices” in UNCITRAL’s work and the fallacy of the adequacy of its 
application in all situations). 
 71. See UNCITRAL FAQ, supra note 1. 
 72. See id.; see also UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 1–3. 
 73. UNCITRAL breaks down its work into a greater number of categories and orga-
nizes them differently. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. This Article highlights 
these four types of work products because they are the most important forms in which 
UNCITRAL articulates legal norms and they have the most impact on international 
commercial law. 
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2. The promulgation of a “Model Law” that states can adopt or use to 
reform specific elements of commercial law within their jurisdictions, 
such as insolvency or sales contracts. These models tend to reflect a 
general consensus on the key principles and structures that should go-
vern an area of commercial law across legal systems and can be more 
or less flexible. 
3. The development of a “Legislative Guide” to aid states in the devel-
opment or reform of a particular area of commercial law. These are less 
specific and structured than Model Laws; they are developed either to 
aid in the interpretation of a model law or to address an area where it 
proves too difficult to resolve the distinctions between national legal 
systems into a common structure. In addition, Legislative Guides are at 
times used by other international and regional institutions (especially 
lending banks and agencies) as part of the conditions for aid to specific 
states. 
4. The “Model Rules” for use by private commercial actors in the de-
sign of contracts, in those areas where states allow businesses autono-
my to construct their own rules of action.74 
This variety of strategies allows UNCITRAL the flexibility to ap-
proach particular areas of law in ways most likely to gain support from 
member states and private actors and thus secure the legitimacy and au-
thority of the institution. 
These tools and strategies emerged over time through a process of trial 
and error. In its first few years of existence, UNCITRAL focused primar-
ily on organizing itself, defining key directions for work, and identifying 
important constituencies that would support that work.75 It was only in 
the mid-1970s that it began to generate a series of work products that 
addressed substantial issues in international commercial law.76 The two 
most important and successful of these were the Convention on Contracts 
for the International Sale of Goods (“CISG”) (1980)77 and the 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules (1976).78 
                                                                                                             
 74. See generally id. A fifth approach is the development of “Legal Guides” to clarify 
the issues presented in attempts to harmonize or “modernize” particular areas of law. 
While important as part of the effort to develop common understandings of legal ques-
tions, these Guides are usually part of the process of working towards the development 
one of the other four instruments. 
 75. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52, at 
481–88. 
 76. See infra notes 73–74 and accompanying text (citing the most important of these 
products). 
 77. See United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 
Apr. 11, 1980, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3, (entered into force Jan. 1, 1988) [hereinafter CISG]. 
 78. See G.A. Res. 31/98, U.N. Doc. A/RES/31/98 (Dec. 15, 1976). 
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The CISG provides a common model for contracts involving com-
merce across national jurisdictions. It has been ratified by seventy-four 
states, varying from key developed economies to a variety of developing 
economies across the world.79 The CISG addresses the classic “conflicts 
of law” problem in international commerce, which has been at the heart 
of the harmonization movement from its beginnings.80 A number of sub-
sequent Conventions, in such areas as international payments and the 
transport of goods by sea, address similar problems. The negotiations of 
such multilateral Conventions, which aim to harmonize law directly 
through a binding treaty, illustrate UNCITRAL’s use of the traditional 
method of the harmonization movement.81 
The Arbitration Rules are designed as a means for private parties to in-
corporate into contracts the designation of arbitration as the dispute reso-
lution mechanism of choice. They are now one of the most commonly 
used arrangements in international commercial arbitration.82 This work 
was a natural outcome of UNCITRAL’s role as the guardian of the New 
York Convention, but also amounted to a new strategy for shaping com-
mercial law. Instead of focusing on changing state-promulgated rules, the 
Arbitration Rules attempt to shape commercial law by influencing legal 
practice “on the ground” through the promulgation of rules private par-
ties are free to incorporate into their contracts, but that are ultimately en-
forced by states through the New York Convention.83 The success of the 
Arbitration Rules demonstrated the potential for such a strategy and bols-
tered UNCITRAL’s authority in the area of commercial arbitration.84 
                                                                                                             
 79. See CISG, supra note 77. 
 80. See id.; see also Joseph Lookofsky, UNDERSTANDING THE CISG 1 (3d ed., 2008) 
(providing an overview and in-depth analysis of the CISG). 
 81. CUTLER, supra note 44, at 207–25. 
 82. See William K. Slate II et al., UNCITRAL: Its Workings in International Arbitra-
tion and a New Model Conciliation Law, 6 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 73, 78–82 
(2004). Other important commercial arbitration rules include those of the International 
Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) and the rules promulgated by specialized institutions 
such as the London Court of Arbitration (“LCIA”), the Stockholm Chamber of Com-
merce, and the American Arbitration Association. Id. The UNCITRAL Rules have also 
become, along with the rules of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes (“ICSID”) of the World Bank, one of the two major frameworks for investor-
state dispute arbitration. See discussion infra Parts II–IV. 
 83. Slate et al., supra note 82, at 82–88, 106. 
 84. UNCITRAL has recently issued a revised version of the Arbitration Rules, de-
signed to incorporate developments in the intervening decades. See G.A. Res. 31/98, 
supra note 78 (as revised in 2010), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/texts/arbitration/arb-rules-revised/arb-rules-revised-
e.pdf. It should be noted that UNCITRAL itself does not conduct or supervise arbitra-
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C. From Harmonization to “Modernization” of Law 
After the completion of the CISG and the Arbitration Rules, the Secre-
tariat and select members identified other areas of commercial law—
such as property, insolvency, and credit—that were within UNCITRAL’s 
ambit to address. After some initial consideration in the late 1970s, how-
ever, UNCITRAL concluded that the political and technical challenges 
of addressing such issues were too great.85 But this context changed in 
the 1980s and 1990s, allowing UNCITRAL to significantly broaden the 
scope of its work and thus its importance as an institution.86 While 
UNCITRAL participants seem surprised and even bemused87 by this de-
velopment, in retrospect it can be hypothesized that changing patterns of 
the global political economy created this opening. The spread of broadly 
neo-liberal, market-opening norms and projects, the growing focus on 
national institutions and rules as “non-tariff” barriers in trade politics, a 
growing concern with the “rule of law,” and the impact of all of these in 
shifting development strategies helped to put a whole range of issues of 
national commercial law on the agenda of international institutions and 
induced states to engage (albeit hesitantly) in projects aimed at establish-
ing global legal standards.88 Importantly, the deepening integration of 
markets, production, and investment flows “on the ground” seemed to 
make more pressing the action to coordinate legal and policy responses 
to the regulatory and crisis-management challenges that they presented.89 
This proved a crucial turning point for UNCITRAL. In the early 1990s, 
key actors in the initiative to deepen global economic integration and 
                                                                                                             
tions; these rules are chosen by commercial parties for arbitrations hosted in other con-
texts or institutions. Id. 
 85. See Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 321–22 (referring to the results of UNCITRAL’s 
discussion of the issue in the late 1970s: “The completed report, however, suggested that 
the divergence among legal systems was then too great to permit unification in the area . . 
. . As a result, UNCITRAL concluded that unification was not at that time feasible, and 
postponed its work in the area of security law.”); see also Spiros V. Bazinas, 
UNCITRAL’s Work in the Field of Secured Transactions, in EMERGING FINANCIAL 
MARKETS AND SECURED TRANSACTIONS 211, 211–18 (Joseph J. Norton & Mads Andenas 
eds., 1998). 
 86. Buxbaum, supra note 39, at 322. 
 87. Regarding the issue of secured transactions in particular, see Burman, supra note 
39 (“In the mid-1990s, the accepted wisdom in the field had placed several areas in the 
‘impossible’ list, consigned to the dustbin because of deep differences in legal traditions, 
the uses of commercial law, and legislative and cultural differences in changing long-
standing law. Secured finance was near the top of that list.”). 
 88. See MARGARET P. KARNS & KAREN A. MINGST, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: 
THE POLITICS AND PROCESSES OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 351–91 (2d ed., 2004). 
 89. See WIENER, supra note 31, at 17–18; see also Leebron, supra note 47. 
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create new frameworks to secure this project—in particular, a coalition 
led by the US, sectors of the financial and investment communities, and 
legal professionals engaged in the reform of commercial law—were 
looking for new opportunities and sites through which they could ad-
vance their work.90 The initial success of UNCITRAL’s limited agenda, 
they believed, justified investing resources to incorporate it into efforts at 
commercial law reform that went well beyond the traditional areas and 
strategies of legal harmonization.91 By the late 1990s, UNCITRAL’s 
work had expanded to include such areas as insolvency, electronic com-
merce, secured transactions, government procurement, and the role of 
private financing in infrastructure projects.92 
The form and self-understanding of UNCITRAL’s work changed as 
well. In light of the reach and complexity of the legal work UNCITRAL 
now undertook, it needed to shift its focus away from the bulky and often 
difficult to negotiate Conventions, and take advantage of the alternative 
and more recently developed tools of model laws and legislative guides 
to help shape the direction of national law reform.93 These could be of-
fered as standards of legal best-practices, circulating among key actors to 
hopefully shape legal reform efforts in more indirect but effective ways 
than formal Conventions. By the late 1990s, the use of model laws and 
legislative guides became the preferred mode of operation for 
UNCITRAL in such key areas as Insolvency and Secured Transactions 
law. 
More generally, UNCITRAL’s understanding of its mission was trans-
formed into one of promoting modernization and reform of commercial 
law in all of its aspects.94 Indeed, the theme of UNCITRAL’s fortieth 
anniversary Congress in 2007 was “Modern Law for Global Com-
                                                                                                             
 90. See sources cited infra note 91 and accompanying text. This interpretation is con-
firmed by an interview with a UNCITRAL official. Interview with UNCITRAL Official, 
in Vienna, Austria (Sept. 6, 2005) [hereinafter Sept. 6 Interview]. 
 91. See Burman, supra note 39; see also Terence C Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, 
Globalizing Law: Political Influence in the Legal Construction of Markets by the UN 1–4 
(2003) (unpublished manuscript), available at 
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/p107001_index.html [hereinafter Halliday & Carruth-
ers, Globalizing Law]; see also Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90. 
 92. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. 
 93. See generally Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Legitimation and Global 
Lawmaking (Fordham Law Legal Studies, Research Paper No. 952492, 2006), available 
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=952492 [hereinafter Block-Lieb & 
Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking]. 
 94. On the evolution of these strategies in the context of insolvency law, see Block-
Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52. 
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merce.”95 As this title and the proceedings indicated, UNCITRAL cur-
rently sees its mission extending well beyond, and taking a different 
shape than, the classic program of legal harmonization/unification.96 
What do “modernization” and “reform” mean in this context? While 
never clearly explained in official documents, participants share the un-
derstanding that the current role of UNCITRAL is to develop and diffuse 
principles and rules of commercial law that are most appropriate to the 
promotion and deepening of global economic integration as it has taken 
form since the late 1970s.97 This “mission” is supported by the belief that 
there are certain particularly effective and “efficient”98 commercial legal 
                                                                                                             
 95. See UNCITRAL Colloquia, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia_general.html (last visited Feb. 
25, 2011); Papers Presented at the UNCITRAL Congress “Modern Law for Global 
Commerce,” 9–12 July 2007, Vienna, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/congresspapers.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011). 
 96. This interpretation is based on observations and reports of the Congressional pro-
ceedings. See Nicholas Michel, Under-Sec’y-Gen. for Legal Affairs, The Legal Counsel, 
Opening Address at Modern Law for Global Commerce: Congress to Celebrate the 40th 
Annual Session of UNCITRAL (July 9, 2007), available at 
http://www.uncitral.org/pdf/english/congress/USG_Michel.pdf. 
 97. E-mail correspondence between author and UNCITRAL Official (Dec. 21, 2005) 
(on file with author); see also id. Particularly important are Jernej Sekolec’s comments, at 
the time the Secretary of UNCITRAL. See Jernej Sekolec, Commentary, Congressional 
Roundtable on Process and Methods of International Rule-Making, (July 9, 2007) (on file 
with author). 
 98. Throughout UNCITRAL’s deliberations and personal interviews with participants 
and officials, the idea of “efficiency” has been used in a number of related but distinct 
ways. The most common usage is to suggest that legal rules and frameworks are most 
efficient if they are most successful at attracting investment to a given national economy. 
This is often explained in a manner drawn from the literature on the competition of legal 
regimes, with the added note that the efficiency of a legal regime is equivalent to its 
competitiveness in attracting the support of actors in financial markets. The presence of 
private investment, in this approach, indicates that investors believe in the superiority of 
the legal regime for protection of investor rights (this claim was often used by supporters 
of U.S. legal models who claimed that these proved most efficient at generating capital 
for private investment, at least prior to the current economic crisis). At other times, 
though, the claim of efficiency is articulated more broadly as the likelihood that a given 
legal regime will promote economic growth in a given economy, though it seems to be 
understood that the generation of private investment is central to that growth. A third and 
usually minor theme in the discussion of efficiency emphasizes reducing the costs and 
complexity of a legal regime, which would then encourage and facilitate greater private 
economic activity. The ultimate hope and claim is that UNCITRAL can use its broad 
representation and mobilization of expertise to identify the most efficient—and thus “ad-
vanced”—legal models and present them in a form attractive to those aiming at legal 
reform. 
584 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 36:2 
structures that will better allow all states, especially developing states, to 
participate effectively in the global economy.99 By creating useful mod-
els and guides that embody these structures with the legitimacy of inter-
national support, the hope is that UNCITRAL can play a key role in 
shaping a positive evolution in the world’s commercial law systems.100 
An example of this kind of process is UNCITRAL’s work on Insol-
vency law. Faced with the increasing challenge of insolvencies that in-
volve corporations with assets in a number of states, in 1997 
UNCITRAL developed a “Model Law on Cross Border Insolvency.”101 
This development aimed at helping states harmonize legal frameworks to 
smooth the work of addressing these complex issues. As insolvency be-
came an increasingly central issue for advanced and developing states, 
and a key aspect of commercial law reform efforts, UNCITRAL then 
took on the more daunting task of developing a “modern” framework for 
the whole spectrum of insolvency law.102 Despite the deep differences 
between legal orders, this task succeeded in the promulgation of a Legis-
lative Guide on Insolvency Law, in 2004.103 This Guide has been a sig-
nificant success, and is frequently used as a reference and model by na-
tional, regional (the EU), and international (IMF, World Bank) actors as 
they develop more robust and “modern” insolvency structures.104 
III. EXPLAINING UNCITRAL’S SUCCESS 
On the basis of this type of work, UNCITRAL has emerged as the 
leading public international institution for the development and diffusion 
of norms in private commercial law. Although the Hague Conference 
and UNIDROIT remain active—and all three have begun to work more 
cooperatively in recent years—UNCITRAL has become the most in-
fluential of the group, able to mobilize more support and to shape the 
                                                                                                             
 99. See Burman, supra note 39. 
 100. See Buxbaum, supra note 39. 
 101. G.A. Res. 52/158, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30, 1998). 
 102. See sources cited supra notes 93–96; see also Halliday, supra note 70; Terence C. 
Halliday & Bruce G. Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law: Global Norm Making and Na-
tional Lawmaking in the Globalization of Corporate Insolvency Regimes, 112 AM. J. SOC. 
1135, 1185–86 (2007) [hereinafter Halliday & Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law]. 
 103. See Halliday, supra note 70; Halliday & Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law, su-
pra note 102. 
 104. See sources cited supra note 103. Similar strategies have been adopted in 
UNCITRAL’s ongoing work on the law of secured transactions, which focuses on a key 
form of business financing. Edward S. Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial 
Law: The Case of Secured Finance, in LAW AND LEGALIZATION IN TRANSNATIONAL 
RELATIONS 58, 70–72 (Christian Brütsch & Dirk Lehmkuhl eds., 2007) [hereinafter Co-
hen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law]. 
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agenda for international commercial law reform.105 How can this success 
be explained? As previously suggested, UNCITRAL is best conceptua-
lized as a “site” rather than an organization, which can be mobilized by 
different public and private actors working in and through its structure. 
The key question, then, is why resource-rich actors, such as states, pri-
vate businesses, other international institutions, and professional net-
works, have chosen to invest resources in UNCITRAL.106 
There are two key parts to the answer. The first derives from the struc-
ture of the world of private international commercial legal practice, in 
which UNCITRAL’s strategy for developing normative models and prin-
ciples to be diffused in varied and subtle ways proves particularly effec-
tive. The second part of the answer is the particular structure and work-
ing methods of UNCITRAL, which distinguish it from most other inter-
national organizations in ways that can both empower resource-rich ac-
tors and allow them to reach agreements that may not be possible in oth-
er contexts. 
A. Where and How Does UNCITRAL Fit in Private International Law? 
The world of private international commercial law is plural, multi-
layered, and dynamic.107 It is shaped by two key principles: the existence 
of multiple and often overlapping legal regimes covering particular areas 
of commercial practice; and significant contractual autonomy for private 
                                                                                                             
 105. These claims are supported by interviews with a variety of participants in interna-
tional commercial law reform and harmonization efforts. This argument should be put in 
context. First, it is a judgment of the relative impact of UNCITRAL, UNIDROIT, and the 
Hague Conference as the three public institutions devoted primarily to private commer-
cial law reform at the international level. It is not meant to compare UNCITRAL’s import 
with that of private bodies that work on commercial law—i.e., the ICC, or the other pub-
lic international organizations, such as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and 
Development (“OECD”), the World Bank, the Basle Committee—which can powerfully 
shape private commercial law even though this is not their primary task. Second, it is a 
judgment focusing on the development of norms, not the success of their implementation 
in particular contexts. 
 106. See BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9, at 52–62 (using a similar approach in 
formulating the question of why resource-rich actors, such as states, private businesses, 
other international institutions, and professional networks, chose to invest resources in 
particular law making projects and institutions). 
 107. See generally CALLIESS & ZUMBANSEN, supra note 42; Daniela Caruso, Private 
Law and State-Making in the Age of Globalization, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 1, 1–3 
(2006). In the literature on “global governance,” these are increasingly seen as characte-
ristics of the “global” arena more generally. See, e.g., JONATHAN G. S. KOPPELL, WORLD 
RULE: ACCOUNTABILITY, LEGITIMACY, AND THE DESIGN OF GLOBAL GOVERNANCE (2010). 
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actors aiming to shape the law that governs their relationships.108 The 
evolution of international commercial law is driven by a dynamic process 
in which actors, and especially networks of actors, in the field—states, 
corporations, professionals, firms and associations—constantly compete 
to shape the substance of law across a variety of law-making and law-
applying sites.109 National codes, standard industry practices, contractual 
innovations developed by law firms, and interpretive traditions can be 
adopted or discarded by commercial agents in the pursuit of business 
priorities.110 As a result, different agents and institutions work continual-
ly to try to shape the choices of private and public actors, whether to in-
crease their own profit, prestige, and influence on conceptions of proper 
legal practice (private corporations, law firms, arbitral institutions, bar 
associations, legal experts), secure the cohesion and stability of commer-
cial practice (industry associations), or to order commercial practice in 
ways that advance national and global priorities (states).111 The most 
successful agents or networks are able to work simultaneously in a num-
ber of fora to shape the direction of commercial legal practice according 
to their own goals and priorities.112 
How does UNCITRAL fit into this context? The key is UNCITRAL’s 
move away from a focus on standard harmonization treaties and toward 
the development of flexible formats in which its work is developed and 
presented.113 The “technologies” of model laws, legislative guides, and 
model rules are much more fluid and flexible than those of formal con-
ventions. It is easier for resource-rich actors to get their preferences em-
bodied in such statements of global legal standards than in formal trea-
ties, and they can then use these products to shape the behavior of public 
and private actors in a variety of nuanced ways.114 As a result, 
                                                                                                             
 108. See generally PETER NYGH, AUTONOMY IN INTERNATIONAL CONTRACTS (1999); 
Mo Zhang, Party Autonomy and Beyond: An International Perspective of Contractual 
Choice of Law, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 511, 511–13 (2006). 
 109. NYGH, supra note 108; Zhang, supra note 108, at 560–61. 
 110. See generally BRAITHWAITE & DRAHOS, supra note 9; see also sources cited supra 
note 108; discussion supra Part II. 
 111. See CONTRACTUAL CERTAINTY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE (Volkmar Gessner ed., 
2009); Sigrid Quack, Who Fills the Legal “Black Holes” in Transnational Governance? 
Lawyers, Law Firms and Professional Associations as Border-Crossing Regulatory Ac-
tors, in GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS 1, 81–100 (Gunner 
Folke Schuppert ed., 2006). 
 112. Cohen, Constructing Power Through Law, supra note 15, at 794. 
 113. Id.; see also sources cited supra notes 106–108. 
 114. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmak-
ing, 32 BROOK. J. INT’L L. 851, 855 (2007) [hereinafter Block-Lieb & Halliday, Incre-
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UNCITRAL’s work product is more useful for actors or networks that 
need normative “tools” that can be advanced in different forms and, to 
different degrees, in the varying contexts in which legal norms are devel-
oped and enforced. For instance, supporters of the Model Law and Legis-
lative Guide on Insolvency can advance them through a variety of strate-
gies, which include, inter alia, convincing commercial actors and indus-
try associations to lobby their home states to reform the law, encouraging 
international and regional lending institutions to incorporate these stan-
dards as conditions on lending capital to states, training legal profession-
als from developing states to advocate legal reform consistent with these 
principles, and advancing these norms via the various informal interna-
tional financial policy-making bodies.115 In the same regard, 
UNCITRAL’s Legislative Guide on Secured Transactions is emerging as 
a reference for national and international institutions promoting the 
reform of credit and property law in emerging market states and, thus, 
serves as a vehicle through which supporters can enroll these institu-
tions.116 Because these are not formal treaties, their audience is not li-
mited to states, nor must they be adopted in toto to exert significant in-
fluence on the development of commercial law.117 They are thus more 
useful for agents attempting to structure legal practice in the fluid fields 
of private international law, allowing them to widely and subtly spread a 
set of common standards and principles. 
As presented above, UNCITRAL’s work is evidence that the Commis-
sion is an increasingly valuable and important institution or site through 
which resource-rich actors can invest in the shaping of international 
commercial law. Its products constitute respected and influential state-
ments of existing global standards and principles of commercial law and 
provide a crucial vehicle for all actors in this area, while UNCITRAL’s 
flexibility provides key tools or technologies for navigating the fluid and 
varied area of commercial law. The value and impact of UNCITRAL’s 
work comes as much from its functionality, as from its formal promulga-
tion, and the innovative use of legal norm technologies make its products 
much more useful to actors who possess the resources to advance their 
adoption in the variety of private and public international law contexts. 
                                                                                                             
mentalisms in Global Lawmaking]; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and 
Global Lawmaking, supra note 93, at 72. 
 115. See Halliday & Carruthers, The Recursivity of Law, supra note 102, at 1153–54. 
 116. Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law, supra note 104. 
 117. See Susan Block-Lieb & Terence Halliday, Incrementalisms in Global Lawmak-
ing, supra note 114; see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmak-
ing, supra note 93, at 72. 
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B. The Structure and Political Dynamics of UNCITRAL 
UNCITRAL’s success is also due to its structure as a site of normative 
development, which has a number of unique features.118 These features 
facilitate the “enrollment” of the institution by agents of legal modeling 
and enhance the perceived legitimacy of its work.119 The basic features 
of UNCITRAL are straightforward.120 It is organized as a general com-
mission that sets broad policy directions, a set of Working Groups that 
carry out much of the institution’s work, and a Secretariat that supports 
this work and links it with the broad policy goals of the commission.121 
Its membership is elected by the UN General Assembly and is distributed 
across five regional groupings: Africa, Asia, Eastern European, Latin 
America/Caribbean, Western Europe and Other.122 Since 2004, sixty 
states have been members of the Commission, though for most of its his-
tory, UNCITRAL had only thirty-six permanent members.123 Each year, 
the entire Commission meets in a plenary session, which rotates between 
the UN headquarters in Vienna and New York.124 The Commission is 
served by a relatively small secretariat of legal experts/officers, which is 
part of the UN Office of Legal Affairs but has been based in Vienna 
since 1979.125 
Each Working Group is assigned a specific area of work126—which 
changes when the Commission identifies new priorities—and is open to 
representatives from all member states. Moreover, each Group chooses a 
                                                                                                             
 118. See discussion infra Parts III.B–IV and accompanying notes. 
 119. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 3–7; UNCITRAL FAQ, supra note 1. 
 120. See sources cited supra note 119; see also Kelly, supra note 3, at 3–9. 
 121. Origin, Mandate and Composition of UNCITRAL, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE 
LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/origin.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); 
UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 3–7. 
 122. UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 3–7; Member States History, U.N. COMM’N 
ON INT’L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/about/origin_history.html (last 
visited Feb. 25, 2011) [hereinafter UNCITRAL, Member States History]. 
 123. UNCITRAL, Member States History, supra note 122 . 
 124. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. 
 125. As of August, 2010, there were fourteen permanent legal officers, including a 
division director of the U.N. Office of Legal Affairs, who serves as Secretary of 
UNCITRAL. E-mail correspondence between author and Sprios Bazinas, Senior Legal 
Officer, UNCITRAL Secretariat (Aug. 24, 2010) (on file with author). 
 126. Currently, the Working Groups are assigned the following topics/areas of work: 
Procurement, International Arbitration and Conciliation, Transport Law, Electronic 
Commerce, Insolvency Law, and Security Interests. Each Group meets formally twice a 
year, also rotating between Vienna and New York, but informal contact and meetings 
occur regularly. Methods of Work, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE LAW, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/about/methods.html (last visited Feb. 25, 2011); 
UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 39–41. 
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Chair from participating delegations, and is assigned a legal officer from 
the Secretariat as its secretary. The Working Groups operate on the basis 
of “consensus” rather than voting, in which the Chair determines when a 
particular proposal or understanding embodies the preponderance of opi-
nion among the state delegations.127 The dynamics of the Working 
Groups are crucial to shaping UNCITRAL’s work and they are characte-
rized by the following features:128 
1. While all member states are eligible to participate in each Group, on-
ly a relatively small set of states do so actively. Active states tend to be 
the same across the Groups, of which the US, France, Canada, and 
Germany, are usually the most prominent, although this list is not com-
plete and there can be significant variations across Groups. The mem-
bership of the delegations chosen to participate in the Working Groups 
varies. The most active delegations involve representatives directly 
from the government ministries whose responsibilities include private 
international law generally and UNCITRAL in particular, and often in-
clude legal experts from academia and/or private practice, while the 
less active and influential are comprised of members of the state’s UN 
mission. 
2. Various non-state actors are able to participate in the work of the 
Groups and often do so actively, though they do not have voting au-
thority. Indeed, in some Groups, these actors are as well-prepared and 
active participants as the major state delegations. There are generally 
two kinds of non-state actors. The first are organizations of profession-
als with a broad concern for commercial law or expertise in a specific 
area of law—for example, the International Chamber of Commerce 
(“ICC”) and the American Bar Association.129 The second type of non-
state actor are organizations of private business actors who play a cen-
tral role in the areas of commerce likely to be affected by the proposals 
of the Group—such as the Commercial Finance Association 
                                                                                                             
 127. While voting is possible, it is avoided for fear of clarifying and hardening differ-
ences between members, and thus hindering the ability to make progress on the work of 
the Group. As one might guess, the determination of the “consensus” of a Group can be 
the source of much controversy, and has indeed become the focus of a current debate, 
which will be discussed in more detail below. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4. 
 128. These characterizations are based on the author’s research as an observer, and the 
analysis in Terence C. Halliday, Josh Pacewicz, & Susan Block-Lieb, Delegations: The 
Micro-Politics of Influence in International Organizations (2009) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author). 
 129. See G.A. Res. 63/120, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/120 (Jan. 15, 2009); see also Our 
Projects, AM. BAR ASS’N, 
http://new.abanet.org/sections/businesslaw/CL190000/Pages/OurProjects.aspx (last vi-
sited Jan. 17, 2011). 
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(“CFA”)130 with the work on secured transactions and the International 
Federation of Insolvency and Restructuring Professionals 
(“INSOL”)131 with the work on insolvency. The participation of these 
actors goes beyond involvement in actual discussions. They actively 
consult with state delegations in the development of proposals, sponsor 
and participate in conferences dedicated to advancing and shaping the 
work of each Group,132 and are regularly solicited for expert advice by 
the legal experts of the Secretariat, to whom they often submit draft 
proposals for the Groups to consider.133 
3. Other significant regional and international organizations—whether 
they are part of the UN System134 or outsiders135—are also able to at-
tend discussions and are at times active in the behind the scenes work 
on key projects.136 
As a result, while the decisions of each Working Group (and 
UNCITRAL generally) are in the hands of state delegations, the actual 
work of each Group often takes the form of a relatively smooth interac-
tion between state and non-state actors working on common problems. 
In light of the efforts made to include a variety of public and private 
actors, it is important to note the lack of transparency that attends much 
of UNCITRAL’s work. There is a paradox here. On the one hand, 
UNCITRAL is a public institution that is open to the participation of all 
UN members and that regularly publicly publishes reports and press re-
                                                                                                             
 130. See G.A. Res. 63/120, supra note 129, ¶ 7; UNCITRAL, COMMERCIAL FIN. ASS’N, 
https://www.cfa.com/eweb/DynamicPage.aspx?Site=cfa&WebKey=b36047d6-f749-
40cc-9133-cf78f437ad7e  (last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 131. See G.A. Res. 63/120, supra note 129, ¶ 7; UNCITRAL, INT’L ASS’N OF 
RESTRUCTURING, INSOLVENCY & BANKR. PROF’LS, http://www.insol.org/page/58/uncitral 
(last visited Feb. 25, 2011). 
 132. For a listing of the most important of these conferences or colloquia, see 
UNCITRAL Colloquia, U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE Law, 
http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/commission/colloquia.html (last visited Feb. 25, 
2011). 
 133. As noted in the discussion, infra, individual experts often serve on the delegations 
of member states. See source cited supra note 128. 
 134. Such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Intel-
lectual Property Organization (“WIPO”). 
 135. Such as the World Trade Organization, the Organization for Economic Coopera-
tion and Development, and the Organization of American States. 
 136. For example, when the question of the use of intellectual property as security for 
lending emerged during the development of the Legislative Guide on Secured Transac-
tions by UNCITRAL’s Working Group VI, the Commission began sustained discussions 
with WIPO officials for expert advice and to ensure that the proposals of the two groups 
moved in the same direction. For an account of this cooperation, see G.A. Res. A/CN.9, 
¶¶ 2–3, U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG/VI/WP.39/Add.3 (July 20, 2009). 
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leases on its work (both in print and on its website). And, unlike other 
private international law-making institutions such as UNIDROIT and the 
Hague Conference, non-governmental organizations are actively encour-
aged to participate in UNCITRAL’s deliberations.137 On the other hand, 
a variety of subtle and not always intentional strategies work to limit its 
exposure beyond the small world of Working Group participants and 
direct constituencies. Access to the Working Groups’ meetings by Non-
Governmental Organizations (“NGOs”) or observers is limited by the 
Secretariat to organizations considered to have relevant legal expertise in 
the specific area of work; in practice, this means organizations of expert 
practitioners and affected businesses.138 Members of these Groups, both 
states and non-state actors, rarely publicize the work of UNCITRAL 
beyond the same scope of actors believed to have a substantial interest 
and support for its work. There is little if any attempt to inform or in-
volve in the work of the Groups potentially interested organizations out-
side of the world of commerce or commercial law—in such areas as con-
sumer protection, sustainable development, labor, or human rights. As a 
result, for all practical purposes, UNCITRAL works behind a curtain of 
opacity. 
What is the benefit of UNCITRAL’s sometimes opaque working struc-
ture? It provides a uniquely accommodating context in which resource-
rich actors and networks can advance legal reform projects and work out 
stable understandings of legal principles with limited oversight. While 
the Commission is able to set and correct the overall direction of the 
Groups’ work, it leaves much of the detail and specific direction in the 
hands of the latter, and there has been little conflict between the Com-
mission and UNCITRAL’s Working Groups.139 As a result, networks of 
interested and resourceful actors can use the Working Groups as a forum 
within which to elaborate, evaluate, and advance projects of legal norm 
definition and thus advance their own goals of legal reform. According to 
participants, UNCITRAL’s most successful work—in the areas of arbi-
                                                                                                             
 137. See UNCITRAL GUIDE, supra note 4, at 4. On the approach of the other private 
international law institutions, see Hague Conference, supra note 48; see also UNCITRAL 
GUIDE, supra note 4. 
 138. See U.N. Comm’n on Int’l Trade Law [UNCITRAL], UNCITRAL Rules and Me-
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tration, insolvency, and contractual engineering—is the product of such 
consensual negotiation among public and private experts.140 
Moreover, the working methods of the institution contribute to bolster-
ing the legitimacy claims made for its products.141 From this perspective, 
the active role of legal specialists and commercial actors is needed to 
make the work relevant, and their participation in the Working Groups is 
a further guarantee of the quality and usefulness of UNCITRAL’s legal 
products. Evidence from such areas as insolvency and arbitration indicate 
that this argument is indeed a significant one in shaping the reception of 
UNCITRAL’s work.142 It is this unique structure, then, that provides the 
other central reason that resource-rich actors have invested in 
UNCITRAL as a tool of commercial legal construction and change since 
the 1980s. 
C. Questions of Power and Legitimacy 
UNCITRAL’s increased prominence raises questions about the impact 
of power relationships in shaping its work and the extent to which these 
relationships underlie claims of its legitimacy. UNCITRAL participants 
and officials offer two arguments to support the value and legitimacy of 
the institution’s structure and the resulting legal products. On the one 
hand, supporters cite the broad spectrum of states involved in the organi-
zation, representing all major legal traditions and levels of economic de-
velopment, and the consensus-based working method as signs of political 
legitimacy.143 They claim that these characteristics ensure that 
UNCITRAL’s legal products represent not the specific issues or agendas 
of certain states, but the considered judgment of the international com-
munity.144 The result, they suggest, is that UNCITRAL’s work can claim 
unique weight and status as normative models in the international sys-
tem.145 On the other hand, supporters emphasize the unique ways in 
which UNCITRAL incorporates expert knowledge into its deliberations; 
                                                                                                             
 140. Interview with Senior UNCITRAL Officials, in Vienna, Austria (Sept. 6–7, 
2005); Interview with Members of State and Observer Delegations to Meeting of Work-
ing Group VI, in N.Y.C., N.Y. (Jan. 25–26, 2005); Interview with Members of Observer 
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 141. See Kelly, supra note 3. 
 142. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52; 
see also Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 93; 
Halliday, supra note 70; Slate et al., supra note 82 (discussing the arbitration aspect with 
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 143. Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90. 
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this allows its products to carry the stamp of advanced, impartial, tech-
nical expertise, rather than the limits of pure political compromise.146 In 
both ways, claims about the working methods of UNCITRAL are crucial 
to narratives of its legitimacy. But there remains both a tension as well as 
an interdependence between the narratives of political balance and pro-
fessional expertise. 
What holds these narratives together? It is the notion that 
UNCITRAL’s structure and methods work effectively to negate the in-
fluence of unequal political power on its products. The combination of 
broad representation and a rule of consensus, as the first narrative sug-
gests, means that one or a few powerful actors cannot impose their norms 
on the institution and its work. As a result, the second narrative explains, 
states are constrained to find legal principles, models, and norms that 
follow the most “advanced” legal thinking and practice in the world of 
international commerce.147 Of course, there are always elements of con-
flict and contention in the process of developing legal products, but the 
combination of political balance and the input of expertise accord solu-
tions that are acceptable to all states. Moreover, the combined narrative 
potentially suggests that the political balance ensured by the working 
methods pushes legal experts and state delegations to advance commer-
cial law in ways that make technical solutions workable within a variety 
of legal traditions and systems.148 UNCITRAL’s work in insolvency and 
secured transactions law has, in fact, attempted to do just this, conscious-
ly producing principles or models that can be adjusted to different legal 
contexts.149 Together, these narratives support the value of UNCITRAL 
                                                                                                             
 146. See, e.g., Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra 
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as a context for problem solving, rather than a forum for the mobilization 
of power.150 
How well do these narratives fit the actual work and impact of 
UNCITRAL over the past two decades? As noted earlier, UNCITRAL’s 
work in this period centered on the promotion of the broad neo-liberal 
agenda of market opening and regulation that has dominated the global 
political economy since the 1980s. Many of UNCITRAL’s crucial con-
stituencies widely support this agenda,151 but that is not to suggest that 
the agenda is simply the outcome of consensual agreement on the most 
“modern” or “advanced” legal thinking. As a site of normative modeling 
mobilized by transnational coalitions, during this period, UNCITRAL’s 
work has been led by a generally cohesive coalition dedicated to advanc-
ing US-based, or common law models, of law as the preferred standards 
for the global economy.152 Across a variety of areas of commercial law, 
this transnational coalition has dominated the agenda-setting of the 
Working Groups and taken the initiative in advancing normative models 
for “modern” commercial law. The following factors, shaping the global 
political economy more generally, facilitated the success of this project 
within UNCITRAL: 
1. Beginning in the 1980s, the construction of the global commercial 
order was overwhelmingly driven by US corporations and markets, 
which brought with them US models of legal practice as the preferred 
                                                                                                             
 150. As such, this narrative suggests that UNCITRAL’s work promotes the ideal of the 
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way of doing business. As a result, the key legal dynamic during this 
period was the spreading influence of these US-based normative mod-
els across the sites of commercial law.153 The direction of 
UNCITRAL’s work, inevitably, reflected this trend. 
2. During the same period, the US state was able to draw on its eco-
nomic and geopolitical resources to exercise “structural power” over 
the global economic order.154 Participating in the global economy 
meant adjusting to this power. The participants in UNCITRAL were 
constrained to do so in the same manner as all the major international 
economic institutions.155 
3. In the world of commercial legal expertise, this same era was one in 
which US legal ideas and models—especially those associated with the 
“law and economics” movement—diffused quickly throughout legal 
expert networks around the world.156 This was partly the result of the 
need for expertise in US law (and, thus, the structural power noted 
above), the growth of global law firms based in the US, and also be-
cause of active efforts of the US legal community to spread its models 
through legal reform work. As a result, the trend of opinion among 
commercial legal experts represented in the work of UNCITRAL be-
came heavily biased towards US models.157 
The interesting twist, in light of this political economy, is that the do-
minance of US-based actors and models in UNCITRAL is not complete, 
and UNCITRAL’s influence and legitimacy depend on maintaining some 
check on any one dominant power.158 In certain areas of work the US-led 
coalitions encountered opposition from advocates of competing models 
of legal principles and practice, representing different national traditions 
and interests or Continental civil law concepts and practices more gener-
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ally.159 As a result, many of UNCITRAL’s more important legal prod-
ucts, such as its work in insolvency and secured transactions, embody 
compromises that attempt to identify fundamental legal principles that 
can be adapted to different legal traditions.160 
It is in this context that the claims to legitimacy surrounding 
UNCITRAL’s working methods take on their importance. By allowing 
all resource-rich actors to participate, requiring the reaching of consen-
sus, and avoiding much transparency, these methods facilitate the 
process of compromise and give all participants an interest in advancing 
the resulting products of each Working Group. This judgment is affirmed 
by participants and observers alike.161 The working structure of 
UNCITRAL, it seems, has accommodated US leadership while forcing 
the kinds of compromises that allow its products to be accepted as state-
ments of a broader international normative consensus on commercial 
law.162 Combined with its innovations in the technologies of normative 
modeling, UNCITRAL has emerged as an institution whose work is sup-
ported by a wide scope of resource-rich actors and is, thus, of significant 
prestige and influence in shaping the commercial legal norms of the con-
temporary global economy. 
IV. EMERGING CONFLICTS AND THE FUTURE OF UNCITRAL 
Over the past four years, UNCITRAL’s success has generated an 
emerging critical dialogue regarding its work, from inside and outside of 
the organization. This dialogue takes form and focus in two critiques 
centered on UNCITRAL’s working methods: one arising from debates 
internal to the institution and one offered by external actors demanding 
                                                                                                             
 159. See, e.g., Cohen, The Harmonization of Private Commercial Law, supra note 104 
(discussing secured transactions law in the context of competing legal principles, in op-
position to US-based models). 
 160. See Block-Lieb & Halliday, Harmonization and Modernization, supra note 52 
(discussing UNCITRAL’s work in the field of insolvency law); see also Halliday & Car-
ruthers, The Recursivity of Law, supra note 102, at 1185–86; Cohen, Constructing Power 
Through Law, supra note 15 (discussing UNCITRAL’s work in the field of secured 
transactions law). 
 161. See Sept. 6 Interview, supra note 90; see also Sept. 21 Interview, supra note 55; 
see generally Block-Lieb & Halliday, Legitimation and Global Lawmaking, supra note 
93; Kelly, supra note 3. 
 162. This dynamic is similar to the tension between “authority” and “legitimacy” that 
Koppell identifies as central to all global governance organizations. See KOPPELL, supra 
note 107, at 31–67 (exploring how the need for legitimacy leads many powerful actors 
(especially states) to accept outcomes that diverge to a degree from their immediate pre-
ferences). 
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inclusion into its work.163 These critiques, in turn, embody and illustrate 
the two forms of emergent challenges to the institution’s legitimacy narr-
atives, discussed above.164 These challenges originate internally with 
active agents dissatisfied with the procedural and substantive direction in 
which UNCITRAL has moved and from outside the institution, resulting 
from the unintended use of UNCITRAL’s work product by agents out-
side of the traditional world of private commercial law.165 The responses 
of UNCITRAL and its key actors illustrate an attempt at what Suchman 
calls “legitimacy management,”166 and their direction and relative suc-
cesses will determine the future of the institution.167 
The internal critique concerns the influence of non-state actors—
particularly legal professionals and organized interests—on the work of 
the Groups and the Secretariat. In May, 2007, the French government 
circulated a memo (the “French memo”) suggesting that these actors ex-
ercise too much influence over the deliberations of the Groups, steering 
their work in directions counter to the goals of many participating states 
as well as exerting too much influence over the work of the Secreta-
riat.168 The French memo highlights two aspects of this influence. First, it 
suggests that the ways in which the “consensus” procedure is used in the 
Working Groups often gives too much weight to the views of non-state 
actors, as chairs and participants tend to give the views of these actors 
the same weight as those of states. Second, the French memo criticizes 
what it believes is an over-reliance on non-state experts and interests in 
shaping work themes, drafting proposals, and otherwise dominating the 
“behind the scenes” work of the Secretariat.169 It also attacks the per-
ceived use of experts and non-state actors in these ways by some states to 
advance their agendas. 
The French memo raises two kinds of issues regarding the manner in 
which UNCITRAL operates.170 On the one hand, it amounts to a not-too-
subtle swipe at the working methods of the US and some of its allies, 
who work closely with non-state actors to define the agenda, shape alter-
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natives, and mobilize support for their own legal agendas. On the other 
hand, the French document takes issue with the broader implications of 
the relationships between states, private actors, and experts that define 
the operation of the institution. According to this position, the lack of 
clear boundaries between public and private actors threatens the legiti-
macy of UNCITRAL’s work by both weakening the control of sovereign 
states over UNCITRAL’s work—the only actors able to claim any au-
thority to make rules that govern the actions of citizens and institutions—
and creating the appearance of the manipulation of UNCITRAL, under 
the guise of impartial international law-making, to impose rules that ben-
efit only interested parties.171 
The solution suggested by the French government is to establish clear-
er boundaries between the role of states and non-state actors through 
changing or clarifying the rules governing consensus, limiting the partic-
ipation of non-state actors in public deliberations, and exerting more su-
pervision over the role of non-state actors in the development of agenda 
items and substantive proposals.172 This approach has been resisted by 
the US and its allies, who believe that UNCITRAL’s current working 
methods best facilitate the organization’s ability to work smoothly and to 
generate products likely to be supported by key public and private 
agents.173 At this point, discussion continues regarding ways of clarifying 
UNCITRAL’s operating rules without fundamentally changing its actual 
work. 
The external critique of UNCITRAL is currently not much more than a 
set of murmurs, but it pushes in a different direction.174 This argument 
centers on the absence of any significant “civil society” presence in the 
work of UNCITRAL, which is at odds with much of the current work of 
the UN and indeed of some of the other major institutions involved in 
shaping the rules of international trade and investment.175 In this debate, 
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the Center for International Environmental Law (“CIEL”) and the Inter-
national Institute for Sustainable Development (“IISD”), both NGOs 
based in Geneva and Canada respectively, are two of the most vocal crit-
ics. Offering their critiques in the context of the ongoing work of Work-
ing Group II, to revise and update the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules,176 
their argument centers on the increasing use of the rules in investor-state 
arbitrations, particularly in the context of bi-lateral investment treaties 
that usually specify arbitration as the preferred means for dispute resolu-
tion.177 In this case, the adoption of UNCITRAL products in an increa-
singly controversial area of public international law—where the dynam-
ics of political conflict and organizational participation are quite different 
than in private commercial law—has opened up UNCITRAL’s rules and 
processes to unanticipated challenges. 
While not disputing the appropriateness of the current process for 
promulgating purely “private” arbitration rules, the CIEL/IISD position 
argues that the use of UNCITRAL rules in disputes to which states are 
parties means that these rules have significant impacts on the use of state 
power and authority, and thus on various groups in a state—such as con-
sumers, workers, taxpayers, and public institutions—whose interests are 
directly affected by public policy decisions.178 But key features of these 
rules that may be appropriate for purely private commercial arbitra-
tions—the general lack of transparency in arbitration processes, the lim-
its on who can be involved in arbitration, the lack of publicity of deci-
sions—are not appropriate when states and the public and sectoral inter-
ests affected by their policy choices are involved. This position suggests 
not only that some modification of the rules themselves is required, but 
also that the process of rule-making requires the involvement of organi-
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zations that can represent the interests of the various publics whose fate 
is implicated in the results of public investor-state arbitrations.179 
This initiative takes a different direction than that of the French gov-
ernment. Rather than attempting to reassert state control over the work of 
UNCITRAL, the CIEL/IISD position argues that a legitimate process for 
international law-making must include the representatives of the diverse 
groups of interests and publics affected by the process and a broader set 
of experts and expertise.180 By implicitly rejecting the ability of states 
alone to provide this representation, it suggests an alternative approach to 
securing legitimacy for international institutions in the context of the 
evolving relationships between the public, private, and expert power and 
authority in the global context. 
The fate of this initiative, though, remains uncertain. CIEL/IISD in-
itially advanced this argument in 2007, in the context of a request for 
observer status at the then upcoming sessions of Working Group II.181 
Despite their status as registered NGOs by ECOSOC, which required 
approval of their participation under UN rules, UNCITRAL initially re-
jected this request on the basis that neither group had “relevant” exper-
tise in the area of arbitration law.182 After convincing the UNCITRAL 
secretariat to reverse this decision, CIEL and IISD attended the February, 
2008 session of the Working Group, where they presented a proposal to 
include special rules for transparency in investor-state arbitrations in the 
revised UNCITRAL rules. While garnering the support of the UN Spe-
cial Representative on Business and Human Rights,183 the proposal led to 
substantial debate over its appropriateness. The Group eventually de-
cided not to pursue the issue and instead submitted it to the Commission 
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meeting that summer for resolution.184 With the support of key states, 
particularly Canada, the Commission instructed the Working Group to 
return to the issue once it had completed revising the “purely commer-
cial” aspects of the arbitration rules.185 
Both the internal and external critiques pose fundamental challenges to 
the work of UNCITRAL. From different directions, both positions 
threaten to upend a delicate balance between the power and influence of 
states, key international business interests and associations, and expert 
communities that have been essential to the operation and success of the 
institution in its current form. To return to terminology introduced earli-
er, UNCITRAL has become an important “site” of commercial law-
making for the global economy because of the ways in which it has been 
mobilized by a set of complex public-private-expert networks to advance 
a particular agenda for commercial law.186 This does not mean that the 
ultimate authority over UNCITRAL is not in the hands of the member 
states, but that its success in advancing an agenda for legal reform has 
depended upon states working with and through such networks. A reas-
sertion of state-centrality, as the French proposal demands, could damage 
these relationships and probably weaken the effectiveness and impact of 
the institution as an advocate for the kind of commercial legal reform it 
has pursued over three decades.187 In such circumstances, it is likely that 
key states that have supported this agenda will reduce their investment in 
UNCITRAL, as would the business and expert networks on which these 
states have depended for their success.188 
A move towards more transparency and the involvement of a wider 
range of NGOs and interests, as the CIEL/IISD suggests, would also 
change the dynamics of the institution, but in a somewhat different, per-
haps more fundamental, direction. By breaking open the relative opacity 
and “below the radar” status of UNCITRAL, it would make it less ame-
nable for relatively closed networks of power and expertise to use it as a 
site for developing law with minimal public oversight. In essence, it 
would reshape the institution in a model more common among interna-
tional institutions in the UN system, which would likely make it both 
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more transparent and less “effective” in generating norms and rules for 
international commercial law.189 Once again, it is likely that such a de-
velopment would lead key actors to shift resources into other fora in the 
pursuit of their agendas. Ultimately, UNCITRAL’s fate will depend upon 
its ability to productively manage and incorporate these legitimacy chal-
lenges. 
CONCLUSION 
UNCITRAL’s success in shaping the world of commercial law over 
the past three decades is an important, if neglected, story for the study of 
how international institutions shape the legal frameworks for global 
commerce. UNCITRAL’s ability to insert itself innovatively in the world 
of commercial law-making, to re-create itself as a forum in which the 
most “modern” and “advanced” norms for commercial law are defined, 
and the persuasiveness with which it has justified its working methods as 
the product of a combination of political consensus and technical “ex-
pert” authority are all essential aspects of its emergence as a key vehicle 
for normative modeling in global economic governance. Together, these 
factors have created conditions in which most powerful actors in the area 
of international commercial law have decided to invest significant re-
sources in shaping UNCITRAL’s work and sustaining the authority of 
the institution and its work product.190 As a result, UNCITRAL is now an 
important player in shaping the practices of transnational commercial 
law in such fields as arbitration, insolvency, investment, and secured 
transactions. 
UNCITRAL’s work has been held together by a shared (but not always 
uncontested) commitment to developing new or “modernized” legal 
norms that promote greater market and financial integration in the global 
economy as well as the desire of most actors to preserve the flexibility 
and opaqueness of its working arrangements.191 To be sure, this cohesion 
is now coming under some strain, as are all the institutions working in 
the field of global economic governance, and the outcome of these chal-
lenges are uncertain. But it is worthwhile to emphasize two lessons to be 
learned, or questions that are posed, by UNCITRAL’s success: 
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1. UNCITRAL has successfully constructed an account of its legitima-
cy that preserves a unique balance between political consensus and 
technical legal expertise. Underlying this account, though, is the as-
sumption that the matters of private international commercial law are of 
little relevance to constituencies beyond states, international organiza-
tions, affected industries, and technical legal experts. Or, if there is a 
broader impact, it is the role of states to incorporate these in their deci-
sions on the substance of UNCITRAL’s work. This has enabled the in-
stitution to limit participation in its deliberations in ways that are un-
available to many institutions of public international law. But commer-
cial law can and does have significant impact on a variety of civil so-
ciety constituencies—for example, communities, workers, and social 
movements—that have had little voice in its operations.192 As the de-
velopments surrounding investor-state arbitration indicate, the growing 
impact of UNCITRAL’s work may be forcing it deal more directly with 
these constituencies. The ways this will impact UNCITRAL’s struc-
ture, operation, work product, and ultimately, its claims to legitimacy, 
will prove a key test of its ability to continue to adapt to a changing 
global political context. 
2. The structure of private international law-making, as illustrated by 
UNCITRAL’s evolution, raises some troubling issues regarding the 
role of power in the normative modeling that informs global economic 
governance. This observation takes off from Braithwaite and Drahos’ 
argument that normative modeling can be a mechanism whereby rela-
tively resource-poor actors exert disproportionate impact on global go-
vernance.193 The example of UNCITRAL, however, seems to suggest 
that the more plural, flexible, and multi-layered the structure of gover-
nance, the more that resource-rich actors are at an advantage in shaping 
the content and application of rules and norms. The exercise of real 
power over time in global governance requires the ability to be present 
and active at a number of sites and to simultaneously mobilize various 
agents and coalitions behind a common agenda that is pursued across 
different fora. In addition to being required by the plural and fluid ways 
in which governance takes place, this kind of forum-shifting ability al-
lows its possessors to work around potential opposition that emerges in 
only one arena. At the international level, it seems clear that only the 
most resource-rich actors possess these abilities over time and across 
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issue areas.194 To the extent that the governance of the global economy 
continues to evolve in more fluid and plural forms, careful thought 
must be given to the implications of this pattern for the design of insti-
tutions through which rules and norms are made, diffused, and en-
forced, and for the ability to uphold claims to legitimacy made by these 
institutions. 
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